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ABSTRACT
PATEL, NAYAN. Does Being Cultured Pay? Racial and Language Concordance and its
Effect on Physician Income.
Department of Economics, June 2012
Issues surrounding race and ethnicity in healthcare have increased in
number as racial disparities as well as minority physicians become more prevalent
in the USA. One such issue is the concordance rate of race and language amongst
physicians and their patients.
The effect of racial concordance in physician patient relationships has been
looked at to determine if it affects the perceived level of health quality. Saha et al.
(1999) found that Black and Hispanic patients were more satisfied in their
healthcare when treated by a physician of their own race. In this study, I establish
whether or not the racial concordance has a positive effect on income. Using
controls established by previous regression analyses, I measure the effect on income
of racial concordance on primary care and specialty care physicians alike.
The findings of this study have importance in terms of incentives for
physicians to culture themselves. If racial concordance increases income, it is likely
that empathy, communication skills, and teamwork is better when physicians and
patients have the same race (Cooper‐Patrick et al. 1999). This suggests that
physicians who are culturally competent will enjoy higher incomes, and their
patients better health outcomes. Policy implications including cultural competency
training in medical schools and required interpreter services may be established
from these findings.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A. Racial Concordance and Communication
Minority populations have become notorious for underutilization of health
care services (Burgess et al. 2008). At the same time, minority physicians are
becoming more and prevalent (Brown et al. 2007). Racial concordance in the
physician patient relationship is an occurrence that is a result of both of these
scenarios. Previous research has shown that, not only do minority populations
underutilize health care, but are actually less satisfied with their health care
providers than white patients (Doescher et al. 2000). When given selection to
choose a physician, minority patients often choose one of their own race (Gray and
Stoddard 1997), and satisfaction improves (LaViest and Nuru Jeter 2002). Studies
have posited that this could be because of better geographical location, or because of
better cultural competence and communication of racially concordant physician
patient groups (LaViest et al. 2003).
This study examines the relationship between race concordance, language
concordance, and physician income. Communication is key in a patient‐physician
relationship, as, without it, patients are likely to feel uncomfortable or unwilling to
follow through with physician orders. However, when patients feel as though their
physician is working with them as a team rather than just giving orders, patient
satisfaction and utilization of the health care system increases (Cooper Patrick et al.
1999). These improvements in health care result from better communication and
mutual understanding of needs, as well as a teamwork that keeps patients invested
1

in their health care (Saha et al. 1999). Thus, I also test the importance of whether or
not a physician utilizes an interpreter service, or has cultural competency training.

B. Income as a Measure of Utilization
Income is used in this study as a dependent measure of utilization. The more
patients that a physician sees, the more that physician will be paid. Controls for
capitation and other forms of prospective reimbursement are used to ensure that
income is a result of patient visits. This study therefore holds importance for
physicians as well as patients. If enhanced communication in terms of cultural
understanding through race concordance and language leads to a higher income, it
may be worthwhile for physicians to access cultural competence training and
acquire another language/interpreter. In terms of demand, minority physicians may
find it worthwhile to locate their practices in a place where supply of their own race
and language skills is low, and demand high or increasing. For patients who are
unsatisfied with their provider, it could be that they lack communication and a more
participatory environment in their healthcare setting. Minority patients may be
motivated to seek a physician who speaks their native language, and therefore enjoy
better health outcomes through proper utilization.

C. Contributions of this Study
Using cross sectional data retrieved from the Health Tracking Physician
Survey in 2008, this study conducts a regression analysis with physician income as
the dependent variable. It is hypothesized that language and race concordance
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between physician and patient groups increases physician income. I find that
cultural competency training negatively affects physician income whereas an
interpreter service positively affects income. The results on racial and language
concordance depend on the race of physician and patient.
Following this introduction is Chapter Two, which is a literature review,
detailing previous research studies relevant to the topic. Chapter Three highlights
the econometric model, the regression equations used and an explanation of the
variables, as well as how those variables were interpreted. Chapter Four is a
description of the data set used, and Chapter Five shows the results of the
econometric analysis. Chapter Six ends the paper with conclusions that show the
policy implications of the results, and possible future research opportunities.
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CHAPTER TWO
RACE AND LANGUAGE IN THE HEALTHCARE LITERATURE
To determine proper controls and a regression model, I review studies that
looked at race/ethnicity and physician income. This review also covers articles that
supply possible reasons for why racial and language concordance may affect
income, and other authors’ hypotheses.

A. Determinants of Physician Income
Weeks and Wallace’s (2006) study on the effect of race on ob‐gyn income
uses individual level data on physicians to determine race and gender effect on
income. The study used the American Medical Association (AMA) Socioeconomic
Monitoring Survey (SMS) data. This dataset is composed of information on
physicians practice and personal characteristics from 1992 to 2001. In order to
guarantee they had the same variables for all physicians, Weeks and Wallace (2006)
further specify their dataset. They do this by only including physicians who returned
responses of black or white clinically practicing physicians, and eliminating those
who did not answer survey questions for the variables they needed. This process
involves choosing physicians who graduated from a US medical school, reported an
annual income, visits seen, weeks practiced, years in practice, percent of Medicaid
patients, and whether or not Medicare patients were admitted. The net income is
then adjusted to 2004 dollars. They also avoid extreme outliers in income and
patient visits by only accepting those within the 1st and 99th percentiles. They then
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categorize their dependent variables into three classes: “Physician Work Effort,”
“Provider characteristics,” and “Practice characteristics”(Weeks and Wallace 2006).
For these variables, several characteristics are observed. Weeks and Wallace
(2006) take into account number of patients seen as well as hours worked, as many
physicians are reimbursed via number of cases seen rather than number of hours
worked. Considering race and gender may affect when someone enters medical
school, years since graduating are taken into account rather than age of physician.
These years are grouped into 5 year dummy variable categories to account for the
inverted U shape of the physician income/age curve. Whether or not the physician is
board certified or has ownership in their practice affects income, so must be
involved. Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements are generally less than private
insurance, so percentage of these cases affect physician income.
Weeks and Wallace (2006) use a linear regression model to compare race
and gender in physician income. They thus include dummy variables for every race‐
gender pair they were investigating. Using SPSS software, they compute regression
coefficients, 95% confidence intervals, and survey weights. If variables are not
normally distributed, they are log‐transformed. The final step of analysis was a
multi‐colinearity test.
Weeks and Wallace’s (2006) conclusions are that female and black
physicians are at a disadvantage financially, even controlling for different practice
habits. The study points out its failings in that there was not enough survey
participation, different response rates existed for different populations, and the self
reported nature of the survey has its own set of biases. Some of the biggest concerns
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that the current study has are that the variables are limited by the data set, and that
quality of care is not a factor.
Weeks and Wallace (2006) are cited by many other authors looking at
different levels of data, or different variables, including Reyes (2007). Though
Reyes’ (2007) study is focused on a particular specialty of physician, it incorporates
subspecialty into the regression equation, further explaining the regression. Reyes’
(2007) study uses the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
individual level data set, which includes similar data as the SMS on physicians.
Reyes (2007) utilizes the Princeton Survey Research data weights to adjust the data.
Similar to Weeks and Wallace (2006), the data is split into personal, professional,
and practice categories. Reyes (2007) uses a log‐linear approach, to estimate
percentage changes in income due to her variables. The “data cleaning” (Reyes
2007) process for the study includes limiting age to 80, including only those sample
that had all of her variables involved, and minimizing outliers by including incomes
within the 2nd and 98th percentile, and patient visits between the 1st and 99th
percentile. In order to offset bias from when physicians were almost wholly male,
Reyes(2007) conducts a separate analysis of obstetricians under 40 years of age.
The regression equation in this study includes age, years in practice, fellowship, type
of reimbursement, and other specialty specific variables. By incorporating specialty,
Reyes (2007) is able to differentiate between gender bias and specialty choice.
Reyes (2007) conducts a regression with all years combined (and added in a
variable for which year the data was from) as well as each individual year to see the
coefficient variance throughout the years. Reyes (2007) also omits a particular value
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of each variable as a regression control. This study also used ordinary least squares
analysis. Reyes (2007) also uses Oaxaca Decomposition to analyze the difference
between gender due to physician activity and difference due to pure gender. This
method can also be used for racial differences.
Among Reyes’ (2007) results of lower incomes with non Caucasian race,
there is a noticeable decrease in this gap throughout the year in the younger
population. This suggests a narrowing gap in different race incomes. Age is not
correlated with income until the interaction term age*age is involved, again
correcting for the inverted U relationship between income and age.

B. Race and the Patient‐Physician Relationship
Previous researchers have explained some ways to formulate a proper
regression equal with controls for physician income levels. However, there are
several other studies that have contributed to the topic of concordance of physician
and patient race. Saha, Komaromy, Koepsell, and Bindman (1999) illustrated the
subject’s importance in their study.
Saha et al. (1999) begin with the knowledge that minority patients both used
and appreciated fewer medical resources. Using the Commonwealth Fund Minority
Health Survey of 1994, they were able to get individual level data for adults in the
US. The survey gives access to healthcare, access, physician, and personal data. From
these participants, Saha et al. (1999) hold approximately 3000 extra phone
interviews with even amounts of white, black, and Hispanic patients. The variable
categories that were created were “Racial Concordance,” “Response Variables,” and
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“Covariates.” These categories allow researchers to find the race of the patients’
primary physicians, patient satisfaction with their healthcare, and control for
demographic confounding.
Saha et al. (1999) analyze data significance using t‐tests (continuous) and
Pearson chi squared (binary, categorical) for bivariate racial concordance. The
significance of the concordance is calculated using a logistic regression. As in their
hypothesis, they find that black and Hispanic patients are more satisfied with their
health care when seen by black and Hispanic doctors, respectively. Black patients
actually are more satisfied with the physician, while Hispanic patients with their
general healthcare. The study also finds that minority patients disproportionately
select for racially concordant physicians. The results suggest that black patients feel
they are more respected by black physicians, which could be a result of cultural
similarity or the fact that, as black physicians see a large amount of black patients,
“cultural competence” (Saha et al. 1999).
Saha et al. (1999) are able partially explain the findings of Doescher, Saver,
Franks, and Fiscella (2000), where minority patients are less likely to be satisfied
with their physician than white patients. American doctors are mostly white, so if
concordance matters in all races, white patients would be more satisfied than the
average with their physicians. These findings are important as they suggest a
positive relationship between racial concordance and physician services use. Thus,
if applied to income, it may be that physicians who practice in areas where their
patients will be racially concordant, they may see and be reimbursed by more
patients. The study has its limitations in that the survey held selection bias, do not
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have enough detail about physician race, and the self‐response survey has its own
bias.
Cooper‐Patrick, Gallo, Gonzales, Thi Vu, Powe, Nelson, and Ford (1999) find
similar results in terms of quality of care and race concordance. The physician
subjects of this study were recruited from a randomized clinical trial for depression
intervention. Thus, the physicians were all from a similar area in New York, as were
their patients. Similar to Saha et al. (1999) the variables involve patient and
physician race and gender concordance. The measure of quality for physicians is
their “Participatory Decision‐Making (PDM)” (Cooper‐Patrick et al. 1999), or how
well the physicians and patients work as a team on a scale from 1‐100. PDM is
measured as the result of several participation related survey questions. This study
finds that African American patients viewed their physicians PDM as lacking in
general. However, the patients who have physicians who are also African American
have a higher rating on the PDM scale, suggesting the racially concordant physician‐
patient teams are working better together. This study shows yet another reason
why evaluating patient‐physician race relationships is important: the ability of the
physician to let the patient take some charge of their healthcare has a bearing on
both patient health and satisfaction, another set of variables that can affect income.
These findings are similar to Laviest and Nuru‐Jeter (2002), who find that patients
who are able to choose are more likely to have racially concordant relationships.
Each group also records more satisfaction with their physicians than when the races
did not match. Laviest and Nuru‐Jeter (2002) also propose that this suggests better
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physician cultural training and interpreter services are necessary for minority
patients.
Brown, Scheffler, Tom, and Schulman (2007) add another layer to the study
and involve market value and supply and demand for physicians. Citing that patients
are more satisfied in racially concordant relationships, they hypothesize that
physicians of certain races, when low in supply locally, would be rewarded from
these relationships. Adding supply and demand criteria explain why, where supply
is high, it is easier to tell that those who served a racially concordant population
have a higher income. Brown et al. (2007) evaluate the supply for physicians as the
percentage of the local physician labor force from a specific race, and demand as the
percentage of that local patient group of the same ethnicity. The study then shows
the difference between supply and demand as the shortage of physicians of that
particular race. Brown et al. (2007) add median income for the local area, a dummy
for each geographical location, percentage of local physician workforce of each race,
and percentage of local population of each race as variables in their regression
model. The interaction between physician race and percent of the population of the
same race is used to determine whether or not racial concordance affects income,
and the interaction between physician race and local physician workforce percent is
used to determine if the supply and demand for that physician race affected income.
Brown et al. (2007) find that racially concordant relationships are beneficial in
Asian and Hispanic populations. This is assumed to be because of the possible
language barriers between foreign (and sometimes native) born Asian and Hispanic
patients and their doctors. Thus, this study will involve whether or not the physician
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has difficulty with any languages the patients speak, as well as whether or not they
have an interpreter service to aid them. This will determine whether or not the
change in income is due to communication or cultural similarity.
Saha, Taggart, Komaromy, and Bindman (2000) further explore the
importance of language and communication. Using a telephone survey data set from
the American Commonwealth Survey, they find that 25% of Hispanic patients with
Hispanic doctors specifically chose their doctors because of their race (Saha et al
2000). Of those, 42% factored in language as the reason (Saha et al 2000). Thus,
determining whether or not language factors into income is an important factor.

C. Contributions to the Literature
This study improves on previous research in that it involves language as
well as racial concordance when looking at the patient‐physician relationship.
Brown et al (2007) show how supply and demand for different races increases
income in Hispanic and Asian patient‐physician pairs, though it is not significant for
Black patient‐physician pairs. As most of the Black and white patient population
speaks English, along with the fact that most physicians are White, speak English
and trained in the US, communication between all groups could be optimal.
However, many Asian and Hispanic patients come from abroad and may speak other
languages. Physicians who understand their culture and language may have the
advantage in treating these patients and having a higher patient cooperation and
follow up rate. Thus, language is an important addition to look at in this model.
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CHAPTER THREE
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF RACE AND LANGUAGE CONCORDANCE ON
PHYSICIAN INCOME
In this chapter, I outline the dependent and independent variables used in
the econometric analysis. I describe the econometric model and the different types
of regressions run using this model. An explanation of why different models are
used is provided.

A. Econometric Model to Estimate Physician Income
The following model is used to determine the effect of racial and language
concordance in the patient physician relationship on physician income. This model
was formed using controls similar to those found in previous research (Cooper‐
Patrick et al. 1999; LaViest and Nuru‐Jeter 2002; Reyes 2007; Shih and Konrad
2007; Weeks and Wallace 2006):

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

∗

Dependent Variables for Physician Income
INCOME
One of six discrete income categories the physician
belongs to
INCHOURS
INCOME/HOURS, the approximate hourly wage of the
physician
PERFINCOME
One of six discrete income categories the physician
belongs to, only includes physicians who have a
performance based aspect to their income
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Independent Variables for Control
AGE

Time since the physician started practicing medicine
Reference group: physicians who began practicing
before 1975

EXP1
EXP2

1 if physician began practicing after 2005, 0 if before
1 if physician began practicing in 2001‐2004, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician began practicing in 1996‐2000, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician began practicing in 1991‐1995, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician began practicing in 1986‐1990, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician began practicing in 1981‐1985, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician began practicing in 1976‐1980, 0 if
otherwise

EXP3
EXP4
EXP5
EXP6
EXP7
GENDER

Gender of physician
Reference group: female physicians

MALE

1 if male physician, 0 if female

SPECIALTY

Type of specialty training the physician has
Reference group: Medical Specialties

INTERNAL

1 if physician specialized in internal medicine, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician specialized in family medicine, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician specialized in pediatric medicine, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician specialized in surgical medicine, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician specialized in psychiatric medicine, 0 if
otherwise
1 if physician specialized in obstetric/gynecologic
medicine, 0 if otherwise

FAMILY
PEDIATRICS
SURGICAL
PSYCH
OBGYN
BOARDCERTIFICATION

Whether or not the physician is board certified in their
specialty
Reference group: Not board certified
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BRD

1 if physician board certified, 0 if not

PRACTICETYPE

Type of practice the physician works in
Reference group: Solo/2 physician practice

GROUP

1 if the physician works in a practice with 3 or more
physicians, 0 if otherwise
1 if the physician works in an HMO, 0 if otherwise
1 if the physician works in a medical school, 0 if
otherwise
1 if the physician works in a hospital, 0 if otherwise
1 if the physician works in some other type of practice,
0 if in a previously defined practice type

HMO
MEDSCHOOL
HOSP
OTHER
HOURS

Number of hours the physician works per year

OWNERSHIP

Type of ownership the physician has in his/her practice
Reference group: Full owner

POWN
EMPLOY
ICONT

1 if the physician is a partial owner, 0 if otherwise
1 if the physician is an employee, 0 if otherwise
1 if the physician is an independent contractor, 0 if
otherwise

VISITS

Number of visits physician has per week

VISCLINIC
VISHOSP
VISNURS

Number of clinic visits per week
Number of hospital visits per week
Number of nursing home visits per week

MEDCARE

Percentage of payment that comes from Medicare
patients

MEDCAID

Percentage of payment that comes from Medicaid
patients

CAP

Percentage of payment that comes from capitation or
other prospective payment system

BONUS

1 if the physician earns income through a bonus, 0 if not

PATRACE

Percentage of patients that are of a particular race

BP
HP
AP

Percentage of patients that are Black
Percentage of patients that are Hispanic
Percentage of patients that are Asian
14

DOCRACE

Physician race
Reference group: White

BD
HD
AD
OD

1 if physician is Black, 0 if otherwise
1 if physician is Hispanic, 0 if otherwise
1 if physician is Asian, 0 if otherwise
1 if physician is a race not specified, 0 if race is one of
the above

Independent Variables Involved in Race or Language Concordance
CUL

1 if physician has cultural competency training, 0 if not

LANG

Number of languages (other than English) that the
physician’s patients speak

INT

1 if the physician uses an interpreter service, 0 if not

Interaction terms
RACIAL CONCORDANCE
BDBP
HDHP
ADAP

Interaction between Black doctors and Black patient
percentage
Interaction between Hispanic doctors and Hispanic
patient percentage
Interaction between Asian doctors and Asian patient
percentage

LANGUAGE CONCORDANCE
Black Physician

Interaction between number of languages spoken by
patient base and Black physician
Reference group: Black physician, all English patients

BD_LANG_1

1 if Black physician, 1 language other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Black physician, 2 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Black physician, 3 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise

BD_LANG_2
BD_LANG_3
Hispanic Physician

Interaction between number of languages spoken by
patient base and Hispanic physician
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Reference group: Hispanic physician, all English
patients
HD_LANG_1
HD_LANG_2
HD_LANG_3

1 if Hispanic physician, 1 language other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Hispanic physician, 2 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Hispanic physician, 3 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise

Asian Physician

Interaction between number of languages spoken by
patient base and Asian physician
Reference group: Asian physician, all English patients

AD_LANG_1

1 if Asian physician, 1 language other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Asian physician, 2 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise
1 if Asian physician, 3 languages other than English
spoken, 0 if otherwise

AD_LANG_2
AD_LANG_3

Three dependent variables are used in this model. All three are different
measures of physician income. The first is INCOME, a variable constructed from the
dataset, which contains six categorical annual income values. These income
categories range from the lowest being “Under $100,000” to the highest being “Over
$300,000,” with four categories separated by $50,000 in between. INCOME takes the
average of each of the categories and turns them into dollar values, so I can use
Ordinary Least Squares to analyze them. The INCOME value is lower bounded at
$80,000 and upper bounded at $350,000 in effort to better capture the average
incomes of low and high earning physicians. INCHOURS is INCOME divided by
HOURS, in order to create an hourly income rate for physicians. PERFINCOME is a
dependent variable constructed to contain those physicians who had a
performance‐based incentive in their income, with the same values as INCOME.
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Many of the independent variables have been chosen as controls that mirror
those used in previous research. Instead of using age or experience squared as an
independent variable to capture the decreasing gains in income as physicians age
(Reyes 2007), I use a set of dummy variables. These allow for the same occurrence
to be captured using the categorical data in the dataset. The longer one has worked
as a physician, the more likely he/she is to be higher paid (Shih and Konrad 2007).
Thus, I expect that the EXP variables will result in negative outcomes, as they are
referenced against the longest practicing group. Gender is another important
control, as studies have found that male physicians tend to have higher incomes
than female physicians (Cooper‐Patrick et al. 1999). The specialty of physicians is an
important factor to take into account, as physicians with different specialties have
different reimbursement rates and salaries, resulting in an income difference
(Weeks and Wallace, 2006). I expect that physicians with more specialized practices
such as surgery and psychiatry to have higher incomes than those in other
specialties. Board certification in one’s specialty is an indicator of ability, so I expect
those who are board certified to have higher incomes than those who are not
(Reyes, 2007). The type of practice that a physician is in can also affect income, as,
for example, those in hospital or group practices can rely on nearby referrals or
benefit from a more concentrated patient base (Reyes, 2007). The number of hours
that a physician work should directly correlate to their income as those who work
more should have a higher annual income. The ownership in the practice is a
variable that was used in previous research to indicate incentives (Weeks and
Wallace, 2006). I expect that those who have full or part ownership will have high
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incomes than employees and independent contractors. The number of visits that a
physician has a week and where those visits are should be, similarly to hours,
directly correlated to income. I expect that physicians with more visits in clinic or in
a hospital to make more than those who have more nursing home visits. Previous
research shows that physicians who have more Medicare and Medicaid utilizing
patients tend to have lower incomes, as reimbursement rates are lower for these
insurers than private insurance (Reyes, 2007). Thus, I expect that higher
percentages of Medicare and Medicaid patients will result in lower incomes for
physicians. Similar to Medicare and Medicaid, prospective payment systems like
capitation result in the physician making fewer profits (Reyes, 2007). I expect a
higher percentage of prospective payment to result in lower incomes for physicians.
The bonus independent variable also acts as an indicator for ability and incentives,
and I expect those who are paid extra with bonuses will enjoy higher incomes.
The variables I am interested in analyzing begin with patient race. Minority
populations are outlined in previous research as having lower incomes as well as
healthcare utilization (Burgess et al. 2008). It follows that I expect physicians who
have a higher minority patient base, holding all else constant, to have lower
incomes. The race of physicians is also a variable of interest. I use dummy variables
to distinguish between White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, and other doctors. Again, as
minority populations have been shown to have lower incomes, I expect Hispanic,
Black, Asian, and other doctors to have lower incomes than the reference group,
White physicians. These variables allow us to control the race related interaction
terms in the model.
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When looking at controlling language, the data offer us three different
variables. The cultural competency variable shows whether or not cultural
competency training has been undertaken by the physician. Due to the constraints
of the data set, we do not know if this training is a punishment from being culturally
incompetent, or an extra training program for physicians who have a culturally
diverse patient base. If this is a punitive measure, it would seem that the physicians
who had to undergo the training would have lower incomes, as they are not as
effective at communicating as those who did not have to undergo the training.
However, if it is an extra measure, it could be that the physicians who have
undergone the training are more effective at communicating with their patient base,
and thus more likely to enjoy higher incomes. I expect that this is the case, and
cultural competency leads to higher physician income. The next interesting variable
is LANG, or the number of languages that the patient base speaks. The more variable
the patient’s languages are, the less likely that the physician can communicate
efficiently with all of them (Brown et al. 2007). Thus, I expect that having a more
linguistically diverse patient population will lead to lower incomes for physicians.
The INT variable is a binary variable that shows whether or not physicians utilize an
interpreter service. As this would increase patient‐physician communication, I
expect that having an interpreter will increase physician income (LaViest and Nuru‐
Jeter 2002).
The interaction terms of interest begin with the racial concordance
interaction. The variables BDBP, HDHP, and ADAP capture the racial concordance
amongst Black, Hispanic, and Asian physician‐patient pairs.
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∙
This example partial derivative shows the partial derivative of income over the
percentage of black patients. When solved, this equation will give the coefficient of
percentage of black patients plus the coefficient of the interaction between black
patients and physicians and the variable of whether or not the physician is black. If
the physician is not black, I simply get
however, I get a value for

, as BD=0. If the physician is black,

. If this value is positive, racial concordance

promotes higher income in black patient‐physician relationships. If negative, the
concordance leads to a lower income. A similar analysis works for Hispanic and
Asian pairs.
In terms of language concordance, the data set offers us only the number of
languages the patient base speaks. Thus, the language interactions BD_LANG,
HD_LANG, and AD_LANG have been split into dummy variables. The dummy
variables allow us to look at whether or not income rises in a given race of
physicians if their patients mostly speak more languages than just English. I expect
that Black doctors have decreasing incomes with more diverse patient bases, as the
Black culture does not have one specific language (Brown et al. 2007). I expect the
Hispanic physicians to increase in income if their patients speak one language other
than English, with the assumption that this language is Spanish (Brown et al. 2007).
However, as the patient population diversifies for Hispanic doctors, I expect the
same communication issues as for White and Black physicians to lower income. As
the Asian ethnicity is very broad and contains cultures with hundreds of different
languages, I expect, contrary to the findings of Brown et al. (2007) that more
20

languages will decrease physician income. With more specific ethnicities and patient
races, I could look at more specific interaction terms for languages, which would
help with the Asian physician/patient case.

B. Estimation tools
This analysis uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and ordered probit analysis
to solve the econometric model. OLS results have a bias as the dependent variable,
income, is recorded in categories in the ICSPR survey. Thus, I take a discrete
variable and assigned each category a numerical value to view the results as if the
dependent variable was continuous. In order to try and remove this bias, I also used
ordered probit analysis.
Ordered probit analysis is used when there is a discrete dependent variable
with more than two possible outcomes. In this case, I have six income categories,
and therefore ordered probit is required. As we cannot treat these categories as
cardinal numbers, we treat them as ordered categories. Ordered probit is a
maximum likelihood estimation technique. It makes the assumption that the
categories for the dependent variable follow a normal cumulative distribution
function. Thus, given the independent variables, it can predict how increases and
decreases in independent variables will affect the probability of the dependent
variable being in a certain category. This measurement is more accurate than using
OLS in this study, as the OLS required manually calculated dollar values for the
income categories. The ordered probit utilizes the cumulative distribution function
to assume a normal function of income values throughout the dependent variable,
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creating a more likely scenario(Stata Annotated Output Probit Regression, accessed
2012). Using the “margins” command in Stata, I am able to calculate the marginal
effects of each of the dependent variables, which can be interpreted as the
probability of a unit change in the variable resulting in a change in category (Stata
Annotated Output Probit Regression, accessed 2012). The model does, however,
have its own error, and is not as accurate as if I had continuous data.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIPTION OF THE 2008 HEALTH TRACKING PHYSICIAN SURVEY
In Chapter four, I describe the 2008 Healthy Tracking Physician survey, from which
the data were obtained. I also explain the descriptive statistics for the used dataset.

A. 2008 Health Tracking Physician Survey Explanation
The 2008 Health Tracking Physician Survey (HTPS) is a cross‐sectional
dataset used in this study. It is part of the Community Tracking Study series, funded
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and conducted by the Center for Studying
Health System Change. The dataset was retrieved from the Inter‐University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR).
The 2008 HTPS was administered nationally to physicians directly involved
in patient care and obtained data on physician characteristics. The survey included
physicians who worked for over 20 hours per week, and excluded federal
employees, foreign medical school graduates who did not have US licenses, graduate
medical students (interns, residents, and fellows), and physicians who were not
directly involved in patient care. The survey respondents were selected with
stratified random sampling with 20 strata, and the list of physicians was provided
from the American Medical Association masterfile. The survey was a mail
questionnaire, and includes probability weight which adjusts for bias created from
nonresponse and probability of selection. The 2008 HTPS also contains a restricted
data set which includes geographic information as well as a continuous income
indicator, however, this was not available to the public.
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B. Descriptive Statistics
The complete 2008 HTPS contains survey responses from 4,720 physicians.
Table 1 (p. 37) shows the descriptive statistics for the dataset used. The responses
for questions used in the construction of the cultural competency, language,
interpreter, bonus, hours, and board certification had missing values, thus reducing
the total number of used observations for the annual income to and the hourly wage
to 4,043. To determine if performance based incentives played a part in the income,
a subset of 1,802 observations with performance paid physicians was used as well.
The average income for physicians in this sample set was slightly over
$200,000, or approximately $90/hour. The performance paid physicians had a
higher average income of just over $216,000. The average patient breakdown was
14.97% Black, 13.85% Hispanic, and 4.70% Asian. The physicians were mostly
White. On average, the physicians were not culturally competence trained, had a
patient base that spoke 1 language other than English, and had an interpreter
service. Black, Hispanic, and Asian physicians had, on average, about a 1% racially
concordant patient base. In terms of language, Asian and Hispanic physicians were
more likely to have linguistically diverse populations.

24

CHAPTER FIVE
REGRESSION RESULTS: RACIAL AND LANGUAGE CONCORDANCE AS A
DETERMINANT OF PHYSICIAN INCOME
In Chapter five, I discuss the regression results for this analysis. The first
section includes the relationship between annual income and the independent
variables. In the second section, I describe the income in hourly terms, and, in the
third, I use annual income and a performance paid physician subset.

A. Regression Analysis for Annual Income
The first set of regression results I report on have annual income as the
dependent variable. Table 2 (p.40) shows the coefficients for 3 OLS and 1 ordered
probit model regressions.
The first OLS regression in the first column of Table 2 (p.40) is a simpler
version of the original model, without language interaction considered. Thus, it
measures only racial concordance rather than racial and language concordance. The
first control, experience, shows results contrary to expectations. The only negative
value is for the least experienced physicians, who, according to the results, earn less
than the reference group on average holding all else constant, which is the most
experienced physicians. This is a non significant result, however, and may be
because there are a small percentage of physicians in the tail end groups. The
highest income bracket is the physicians who began practicing in 1991‐1995. This
could be a result of aging physicians working less, or moving to less intense
specialties. As expected, the male gender earns more than females, which is
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consistent with Cooper‐Patrick et al. (1999) and Reyes (2007). In terms of
specialties, Surgical and Medical specialties earn the most while Family and
Pediatric specialties earn the least, on average holding all else constant. This is
another expected result, as the more intense specialties earn more (Shih and
Konrad, 2007). Board certification, as expected, led to higher incomes for physicians
as well. In terms of practice organization, solo practitioners had the lowest income
on average holding all else constant, with hospital workers having the highest. For
every hour worked, physicians earned $11.51 extra on average holding all else
constant. This is a smaller number than expected, possibly because the number of
hours physicians work matter less than the complexity and number of cases they
see. Full ownership of a practice earned physicians less than partial ownership,
though more than both being an employee or independent contractor. This is again
likely because those in a group practice are more specialized, while practice owners
are more like solo and in primary care. The results also show that hospital visits pay
more than clinic visits, likely because these visits are more complicated and
reimburse more. Though the values for Nursing home visits, Medicare, Medicaid,
and prospective form payments were insignificant, they had a negative value. This is
likely because the more nursing home, or Medicare/Medicaid/capitation visits a
physician has, the less time they have for higher reimbursing patients. Bonus
eligibility positively affects income, as per expectations. Similar to how Cooper‐
Patrick et al. (1999) and Saha et al. (1999) reported, higher percentages of Black
and Hispanic patients negatively affected physician income. This could be a result of
lower incomes or lower utilization in the minorities. An increase in Asian patients,
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unexpectedly, led to an average increase in income holding all else constant, though
this result was non‐significant. All results for race of physician are non significant,
though they predicted significantly lower incomes for Black, Hispanic, and Other
physicians in comparison to White and Asian physicians. Cultural competency
training has a significant and large negative impact on physician income, suggesting
that it indicates physicians who cannot properly communicate with their patients,
rather than those who are willing to go the extra mile to communicate better. The
number of non English languages that patients spoke unexpectedly increased
physician income, though the effect was non significant. The interpreter service
greatly increased physician income, and was significant. This could suggest that
those with interpreter service are able to cater better to more linguistically diverse
patients, giving them a premium in incomes as number of languages increases. The
racial concordance terms for all three races were non significant, though Black and
Hispanic pairs had positive values and Asian pairs had a negative effect on income.
The second OLS, in the second column of Table 2 (p.40) was created to
determine whether or not interpreter was an endogenous variable. It was assumed
possible that those physicians who have higher incomes are better able to hire
interpreter services. However, as I can see from the regression, all values of
variables are similar to OLS 1, except that the interpreter service seems to be
expressed in the language variable, which is now larger and significant. This
suggests that the interpreter service is not endogenous, but indeed necessary. These
results reflect the findings of Brach and Fraserirector (2000), who suggested that
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most interpreter services are volunteer or reimbursable, so they are not affected by
physician income.
The third column of Table 2 (p.40) includes the language interaction
dummies for physician patient relationships. The findings for the control variables
are very similar to OLS 1, though in this regression. For language concordance, the
results are non significant. Black physicians experienced the largest negative impact
when their patients spoke one language other than English. When patients spoke
three or more non‐English languages, the negative impact was much lower. This
could be because, as patients become more diversified, physicians are more
incentivized (or required) to hire an interpreter, etc., to better communicate with
their patients. Also, those physicians who have a wider linguistic patient base may
have better language and communications themselves, leading to all sorts of
patients choosing them over other physicians. For Hispanic physicians, income
actually rises by a large portion when the patients speak one language other than
English, but falls like the others when the patients speak two or three. Asian
physicians have a negative impact regardless of how many languages patients speak
other than English.
The final column of Table 2 (p.40) is the ordered probit analysis of the annual
income. The ordered probit analysis is required because of the discrete nature of the
dependent variable. The coefficients given are not read in dollar amounts like the
OLS estimates, but rather ordered log‐odds estimates. Thus, for example, if a
physician began his or her practice in 2001‐2005, their ordered log‐odds of being in
a higher income category than those who began before 1975 would increase by
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0.232, on average holding all other variables constant. Thus, a positive value
indicates a higher probability of being in a higher income category with a unit
increase in the variable, whereas a negative value is an increased probability of
being in a lower category. The cut points in Table 2 (p.40) show the values for the
different categories with null values in the variables. Thus, if a physician had null
values for all variables and a latent variable value between 1.206 (Cut 2) and 1.903
(Cut 3) would be in income category 3, $150,000‐$200,000 annual income. (Stata
Annotated Output Probit Regression, accessed 2012). The ordered probit results are
similar to that of the OLS.

B. Regression Analysis for Hourly Wage
In order to obtain more variety using the categorical variables, I also divided
annual income by hours worked to find average hourly wage and if it is affected by
racial and language concordance. Table 3 (p. 44) shows the results of this analysis,
with three columns of OLS regressions. Ordered probit was not conducted on this
set of variables because they were treated as continuous.
The first column of Table 3 (p. 44) shows the simple model OLS regression
with income in hourly wage rather than annual. This regression has very similar
results to the second column, which once again removed interpreter services from
the regression model. Though the significance and general values of the control
variables were the same as those illustrated in Table 2 (p.40), this regression
showed interesting results for racial and language concordance. Unlike with yearly
wage, Black and Hispanic physician‐patient pairings had positive (though non
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significant) values for hourly wage. This could mean that Black and Hispanic
physicians tended to work fewer hours a year, but do have positive effect from racial
concordance at an hourly rate. Asian physician patient pairings still have a negative
value.
The third column of Table 3 (p. 44) reintroduced language concordance
interactions. Though insignificant, there are two interesting positive values for
coefficients. In terms of language concordance, Hispanic physicians still gain an
hourly premium for treating patients who speak 1 language other than English, and,
at an hourly rate, Asian physicians show a similar positive value for patients who
speak 1 non‐English language. Again, it is possible that Asian physicians work fewer
hours at a higher rate with these patients, putting a premium on language
concordance.

C. Regression analysis for Performance‐based Income
Looking at income may not give us the whole picture, as some physicians
may simply work more or less hours, skewing the results. Thus, Table 4 (p. 48) uses
a subset of physicians whose salaries are determined with performance based
incentives. Thus, those who are better at communicating will have higher incomes,
as their patients will have better health outcomes and satisfaction (LaViest and
Nuru‐Jeter, 2002).
Column 1 of Table 4 (p. 48) starts off with the simpler model used in the first
columns of previous regression tables, and has similar results to column 2 of Table 4
(p. 48), the regression without interpreter. The only control variable that changes
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relative to the previous two regression models is that full ownership of a practice is
more beneficial than part ownership, likely because those who own a practice and
pay themselves by performance of the practice can get a hefty bonus. In this case,
though insignificant, the positive values suggest Hispanic physicians, Asian
physicians, and Other physicians are paid more than White physicians and Black
physicians. This is a positive result for our analysis, as it is those physicians who are
most likely to have language concordance with non‐English speakers who have
higher incomes, on average holding all else constant. In this regression, the incomes
of physicians drop as number of their multilingual speaking patients increases. This
is also expected, as, according to Table 1 (p. 37), the large majority of physicians are
White, and are therefore assumed to be less fluent than ethnic physicians in other
languages. The racial concordance interactions show that Black physician and
patient pairs still add a premium to physician income, though Hispanic physician
patient pairs now negatively effect income, though these numbers are non
significant.
In terms of language concordance, I can see from column 3 of Table 4 (p. 48)
that, as the number of languages spoken by their patients increase, Black and Asian
physician incomes rise, while Hispanic physicians incomes fall. This could again be a
function of the language that the Hispanic physicians speak, rather than those of the
patients.
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CHAPTER SIX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary of Results
This study takes 2008 ICPSR Health Tracking Physician Survey data and uses
it to examine the effect of racial and language concordance in the physician‐patient
relationship and its effect on physician income. Previous research is expanded on by
attempting to discover if language concordance is the cause of the premium paid to
physicians in racially concordant relationships.
This study does not support the hypothesis that racial and language
concordance positively effect physician income in the physician patient relationship.
Due to lack of significance, though some variables had similar positive/negative
signs as those expected, I could not reject the null hypothesis. From the insignificant
results that were obtained, racial concordance is shown to have a positive effect on
income with Black and Hispanic physician‐patient pairs, but not Asian. This could be
attributed to the fact that, while Black and Hispanic cultures are more specific, the
Asian title has subcultures that are as dissimilar within themselves as they are to
other cultures. Thus, though the race is defined as the same, the pair does not
benefit from communication improvements Cooper‐Patrick et al. (1999) would
suggest. The study found that cultural competency training was a negative
contributor to income, suggesting that cultural competency training is used when
physicians have been proven to have poor communication skills, and need
improvement already. Interpreter services was a large positive contributor to
income. This suggests that physicians who are willing to try to find interpreter
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services for their patients are likely to receive an income premium. It could also be
that the use of the interpreter service draws patients from other competitors to
their practice, rather than better communication with those patients. For language
concordance, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Trends in the results showed
that income should increase when physicians have either all English speaking
patients, or patients with a wide variety of languages. This can be explained by
physicians who have all English patients not needing to become culturally
competent or hire interpreter services, and having perfect communication
regardless. Physicians who may be multi lingual themselves or be open to more
cultures and therefore more keen on proper communication may find themselves
having a more varied patient base, keeping their income high.

B. Policy Implications
Several policy implications can be gleaned from this study and possible
future research. First and foremost, I have found a strong positive relationship
between the use of interpreter services and physician income. If physicians were
pushed to utilize more available communications tools such as these, physicians
would enjoy an increase in income while patients would enjoy better health
outcomes (Brach and Fraserirector, 2000). Cultural competency programs that are
aimed at improving communication and understanding should also become a part of
undergraduate or graduate medical training, rather than an optional or punitive
action. This way, all physicians will be able to better communicate with a variety of
patients and enjoy a more diverse patient base as well as offer more choice for
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minority patients. This cultural competency training could also involve medical
beliefs and behaviors that are common in other cultures, further specifying
healthcare information for patients. Overall, the study shows that gains can be seen
from the physician side as well as for patients when physicians are more aware or
immersed in culture, and policy should be made to reflect that.
C. Further Research Opportunities
This study is conducted with a limited data set that had survey bias, sample
selection bias, and censored data. If further research could be done to more
accurately explore this hypothesis, several changes would need to be made. First,
physician income should be continuous, allowing for more specific information. The
language variable should include the languages that the physician speaks as well as
the specific languages their patients speak, allowing the researcher to construct a
more accurate interaction term without using the assumption in this study. Similar
to the Brown et al. (2007) study, geographic data should be included in the study.
This will allow the researcher to determine the kinds of cultures that permeate the
market in which the physician is located, ruling out some serendipity in the choices
of patients and their physicians. Also, physicians are not the only members of staff
that can communicate with or deal with patients. Further studies should look at
whether or not physicians hire multicultural staff to help acclimatize minority
patients, involve family members to facilitate communication, or consult with
traditional healers to better understand minority patient practices (Brach and
Fraserirector 2000).
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables used in
analysis
Variable
Income Measurements

Mean

Min

203765.90
(90570.39)
90.12
(49.15)
216097.90
(90524.13)

Annual Income
Hourly Income
Performance based Income

Max
80000

350000

19.231

673.077

80000

350000

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

0.90
(0.30)

0

1

0.39
(0.49)

0

1

Experience
0.05
(0.22)
0.12
(0.34)
0.17
(0.38)
0.14
(0.35)
0.15
(0.36)
0.14
(0.35)
0.10
(0.30)

Beginning year of practice after 2005
Beginning year of practice 2001‐2004
Beginning year of practice 1996‐2000
Beginning year of practice 1991‐1995
Beginning year of practice 1986‐1990
Beginning year of practice 1981‐1985
Beginning year of practice 1976‐1980
Gender

0.73
(0.44)

Male
Specialty

0.13
(0.34)
0.17
(0.38)
0.09
(0.29)
0.19
(0.39)
0.07
(0.25)
0.06
(0.25)

Internal Medicine
Family Medicine
Pediatric Medicine
Surgical Medicine
Psychiatric Medicine
Obstetric/Gynecologic Medicine
Certification
Board Certification
Type of Practice
Group Practice
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0.03
(0.18)
0.07
(0.26)
0.12
(0.33)
0.04
(0.20)

HMO
Medical School
Hospital
Other

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

1

1

4160

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

150

0

70

0

10

0

100

0

100

11.68
(22.64)

0

100

0.45
(0.50)

0

1

0

51

0

51

0

26

0

1

0

1

0

1

Time Worked
2425.81
(734.47)

Hours
Ownership in Practice

0.26
(0.44)
0.38
(0.49)
0.047
(0.21)

Partial Ownership
Employee
Independent Contractor
Visits per week

67.97
(38.85)
13.34
(19.67)
0.77
(2.47)

Clinic Visits
Hospital Visits
Nursing Home Visits
Types of Reimbursement

31.18
(22.94)
16.73
(20.39)

Percentage of Medicare reimbursement
Percentage of Medicaid reimbursement
Percentage of prospective payment
reimbursement
Bonus eligibility
Race of patients

14.97
(14.71)
13.85
(14.42)
4.69
(6.14)

Percentage of Black patients
Percentage of Hispanic patients
Percentage of Asian patients
Race of Physician

0.052
(0.22)
0.035
(0.18)
0.14
(0.35)

Hispanic physician
Black physician
Asian physician
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0.01
(0.11)

Other physician

0

1

0

1

0

3

0

1

0

51

0

51

0

26

0.01
(0.08)

0

1

0.01
(0.06)

0

1

0.01
(0.08)

0

1

0.01
(0.12)

0

1

0.01
(0.07)

0

1

0.01
(0.09)

0

1

0.03
(0.19)

0

1

0.01
(0.12)

0

1

Language parameters
0.39
(0.49)
0.89
(1.08)
0.55
(0.50)

Cultural competency training
Number of non‐English languages patients
speak
Interpreter service
Racial Concordance

1.19
(7.06)
1.37
(7.33)
1.19
(4.39)

Black physician/patient interaction
Hispanic physician/patient interaction
Asian physician/patient interaction
Language Concordance
Black physician, 1 non‐English language
spoken by patients
Black physician, 2 non‐English languages
spoken by patients
Black physician, 3 non‐English languages
spoken by patients
Hispanic physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients
Hispanic physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients
Hispanic physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients
Asian physician, 1 non‐English language
spoken by patients
Asian physician, 2 non‐English languages
spoken by patients

0.02
Asian physician, 3 non‐English languages
0
1
(0.15)
spoken by patients
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Observations
4,043
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses
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Table 2. Regression results for Annual Income
OLS 1

OLS 2

OLS 3

Ordered probit

Dependent Variable:
Income
Experience
Beginning year of practice
after 2005
Beginning year of practice
2001‐2004
Beginning year of practice
1996‐2000
Beginning year of practice
1991‐1995
Beginning year of practice
1986‐1990
Beginning year of practice
1981‐1985
Beginning year of practice
1976‐1980
Gender
Male
Specialty
Internal Medicine
Family Medicine
Pediatric Medicine
Surgical Medicine
Psychiatric Medicine
Obstetric/Gynecologic
Medicine
Certification
Board Certification

‐5,511.35
(6,730.78)

‐5,410.9
(6,752.99)

‐5,040.61
(6,746.67)

‐0.062
(‐0.103)

13,147.39**
(5,330.24)

13,170.75**
(5,331.64)

13,174.48**
(5,334.92)

0.232**
(0.082)

27,644.20***
(4,947.12)

27,619.43***
(4,954.75)

27,575.03***
(4,948.49)

0.42**
(0.076)

33,609.68***
(5,123.59)

33,512.31***
(5,131.03)

33,791.17***
(5,127.55)

0.526**
(0.078)

27,117.84***
(5,006.43)

27,128.50***
(5,014.41)

27,095.52***
(5,006.63)

0.426**
(0.076)

22,513.99***
(5,122.39)

22,386.53***
(5,129.86)

22,425.80***
(5,127.48)

0.345**
(0.079)

19,345.66***
(5,463.13)

18,894.04***
(5,454.45)

19,122.79***
(5,462.10)

0.305**
(0.083)

33,789.18***
(2,776.42)

33,944.25***
(2,776.38)

33,779.12***
(2,777.44)

0.531**
(0.042)

‐64,882.94***
(3,931.95)
‐74,556.14***
(3,853.05)
‐71,552.54***
(4,782.27)
16,513.67***
(3,800.83)
‐40,021.34***
(5,531.01)

‐64,913.13***
(3,929.61)
‐74,674.50***
(3,858.46)
‐72,029.08***
(4,784.85)
16,695.87***
(3,802.27)
‐40,379.86***
(5,539.89)

‐64,720.41***
(3,940.51)
‐74,603.70***
(3,859.18)
‐71,603.58***
(4,774.48)
16,580.63***
(3,808.61)
‐39,662.60***
(5,558.70)

‐0.91**
(0.060)
‐1.079**
(0.060)
‐1.074**
(0.076)
0.215**
(0.056)
‐0.52**
(0.084)

‐4,872.24
(5,674.61)

‐4,920.70
(5,683.94)

‐4,820.37
(5,671.43)

‐0.076
‐0.081

17,085.50***
(4,012.66)

17,277.49***
(4,009.86)

17,010.44***
(4,012.82)

0.272**
(0.062)
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Type of Practice
Group Practice
HMO
Medical School
Hospital
Other
Time Worked
Hours
Ownership in Practice
Partial Ownership
Employee
Independent Contractor
Visits per week
Clinical Visits
Hospital Visits
Nursing Home Visits
Types of Reimbursement
Percentage of Medicare
reimbursement
Percentage of Medicaid
reimbursement
Percentage of prospective
payment reimbursement
Bonus eligibility
Race of patients
Percentage of Black
patients
Percentage of Hispanic
patients

23,646.30***
(3,675.51)
21,806.40***
(7,025.37)
10,937.81*
(6,178.19)
31,764.23***
(5,325.86)
29,746.30***
(6,179.43)

23,982.88***
(3,675.21)
21,721.31***
(6,977.12)
10,897.75*
(6,183.95)
31,943.92***
(5,320.56)
30,433.37***
(6,168.59)

23,865.87***
(3,681.17)
22,180.73***
(7,028.59)
11,156.57*
(6,167.24)
32,053.72***
(5,335.08)
30,525.08***
(6,203.03)

0.378**
(0.055)
0.407**
(0.105)
0.201*
(0.090)
0.528**
(0.078)
0.524**
(0.096)

11.51***
(1.94)

11.51***
(1.94)

11.37***
(1.94)

0**
(0.000)

5,842.05
(4,021.82)
‐20,117.24***
(4,170.53)
‐15,585.50**
(6,796.51)

5,905.83
(4,025.29)
‐20,226.74***
(4,175.96)
‐14,960.55**
(6,783.31)

5,939.45
(4,030.31)
‐20,170.44***
(4,177.59)
‐15,608.25**
(6,811.04)

0.116
‐0.06
‐0.235**
(0.062)
‐0.215*
(0.102)

421.40***
(37.94)
507.39***
(74.57)
‐93.47
(486.02)

424.78***
(38.00)
506.09***
(74.65)
‐86.33
(487.16)

421.65***
(37.99)
510.61***
(74.87)
‐95.51
(487.67)

0.007**
(0.001)
0.008**
(0.001)
0.002
(‐0.007)

‐75.17
(60.39)

‐77.88
(60.32)

‐78.55
(60.48)

‐0.001
(‐0.001)

‐102.96
(70.76)

‐100.30
(70.77)

‐109.14
(70.62)

‐0.001
(‐0.001)

‐21.08
(57.49)
11,423.73***
(2,431.98)

‐20.57
(57.45)
11,531.02***
(2,433.16)

‐22.45
(57.48)
11,381.09***
(2,436.59)

0
(‐0.001)
0.194**
(0.036)

‐351.62***
(85.37)

‐353.07***
(85.43)

‐354.70***
(85.56)

‐0.005**
(0.001)

‐162.52*

‐116.31

‐149.38

‐0.002
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Percentage of Asian
patients
Race of Physician
Hispanic physician
Black physician
Asian physician
Other physician
Language parameters
Cultural competency
training
Number of non‐English
languages patients speak
Interpreter service
Racial Concordance
Black physician/patient
interaction
Hispanic physician/patient
interaction
Asian physician/patient
interaction

(94.51)

(92.61)

(94.85)

(‐0.001)

155.84
(253.04)

110.06
(253.34)

133.06
(254.32)

0.001
(‐0.004)

‐12,879.18
(9,325.84)
‐15,494.44
(16,134.16)
961.05
(4,518.23)
‐8,874.96
(9,589.75)

‐12,633.30
(9,330.06)
‐15,606.62
(16,124.60)
1,407.19
(4,514.45)
‐9,009.58
(9,639.24)

‐15,856.91
(10,608.27)
‐9,307.06
(17,996.63)
4,853.01
(5,726.62)
‐9,061.89
(9,613.73)

‐0.243
(‐0.164)
‐0.16
(‐0.25)
0.098
(‐0.086)
‐0.149
(‐0.143)

‐7,545.61***
(2,484.88)

‐7,602.71***
(2,486.26)

‐7,553.25***
(2,487.69)

‐0.109**
(0.037)

927.04
(1,903.04)
9,155.10**
(4,091.26)

4,318.88***
(1,222.74)

1,858.48
(2,216.17)
8,572.26*
(4,687.82)

(‐0.033)
0.116
(‐0.069)

227.99
(409.76)

223.64
(409.57)

228.93
(408.51)

0.004
(‐0.006)

423.62
(287.23)

400.14
(287.97)

353.96
(282.42)

0.005
(‐0.004)

‐219.19
(414.43)

‐246.28
(413.47)

‐178.81
(424.73)

‐0.003
(‐0.006)

‐17,115.25
(15,616.70)

‐0.291
(‐0.255)

‐16,845.23
(15,686.68)

‐0.124
(‐0.225)

‐2,715.59
(15,013.29)

‐0.027
(‐0.221)

16,656.52

0.248

Language Concordance
Black physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients
Black physician, 2 non‐
English languages spoken
by patients
Black physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients
Hispanic physician, 1
non‐English language spoken
by patients
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0.032

Hispanic physician, 2
non‐English languages spoken
by patients
Hispanic physician, 3
non‐English languages spoken
by patients
Asian physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients
Asian physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients
Asian physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

(12,714.71)

(‐0.188)

‐1,632.02
(17,372.75)

‐0.014
(‐0.276)

‐1,704.97
(14,619.94)

‐0.044
(‐0.218)

‐4,347.11
(7,822.12)

‐0.11
(‐0.12)

‐11,648.50
(9,830.81)

‐0.115
(‐0.143)

‐9,424.15
(8,721.80)

‐0.158
(‐0.13)
0.186
(‐0.127)
1.206**
(0.127)
1.903**
(0.129)
2.416**
(0.130)
2.856**
(0.131)

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Constant
Observations
R‐squared

102,634.87***
(8,063.64)

103,282.68***
(8,078.32)

102,434.98***
(8,087.67)

4,043
0.392

4,043
0.391

4,043
0.393

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3. Regression results for Hourly Wage
OLS 1

OLS 2

OLS 3

Dependent Variable: Hourly Wage
Experience
Beginning year of practice after 2005
Beginning year of practice 2001‐2004
Beginning year of practice 1996‐2000
Beginning year of practice 1991‐1995
Beginning year of practice 1986‐1990
Beginning year of practice 1981‐1985
Beginning year of practice 1976‐1980
Gender
Male
Specialty
Internal Medicine
Family Medicine
Pediatric Medicine
Surgical Medicine
Psychiatric Medicine
Obstetric/Gynecologic Medicine
Certification
Board Certification
Type of Practice
Group Practice
HMO
Medical School
Hospital
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‐19.12***
(4.28)
‐8.34**
(3.77)
‐2.91
(3.41)
1.15
(3.74)
‐1.50
(3.59)
‐3.42
(3.51)
1.50
(3.79)

‐19.07***
(4.28)
‐8.33**
(3.77)
‐2.92
(3.42)
1.10
(3.74)
‐1.49
(3.59)
‐3.48
(3.52)
1.29
(3.80)

‐19.09***
(4.31)
‐8.33**
(3.77)
‐2.95
(3.41)
1.05
(3.72)
‐1.61
(3.60)
‐3.39
(3.52)
1.37
(3.80)

7.11***
(1.77)

7.18***
(1.77)

7.13***
(1.78)

‐26.92***
(2.29)
‐28.25***
(2.35)
‐23.30***
(2.82)
9.64***
(2.54)
‐14.27***
(3.87)
‐5.72*
(3.19)

‐26.94***
(2.29)
‐28.30***
(2.35)
‐23.52***
(2.82)
9.72***
(2.54)
‐14.43***
(3.88)
‐5.74*
(3.19)

‐26.76***
(2.31)
‐28.20***
(2.35)
‐23.45***
(2.80)
9.37***
(2.48)
‐14.53***
(3.87)
‐5.93*
(3.16)

9.38***
(2.54)

9.47***
(2.54)

9.60***
(2.55)

11.08***
(2.43)
10.71**
(5.02)
‐0.72
(3.75)
14.34***

11.24***
(2.42)
10.67**
(5.01)
‐0.74
(3.75)
14.42***

11.08***
(2.43)
10.71**
(5.02)
‐1.03
(3.77)
14.25***

Other
Ownership in Practice
Partial Ownership
Employee
Independent Contractor
Visits per week
Clinical Visits
Hospital Visits
Nursing Home Visits
Types of Reimbursement
Percentage of Medicare reimbursement
Percentage of Medicaid reimbursement
Percentage of prospective payment reimbursement
Bonus eligibility
Race of patients
Percentage of Black patients
Percentage of Hispanic patients
Percentage of Asian patients
Race of Physician
Hispanic physician
Black physician
Asian physician
Other physician
Language parameters
Cultural competency training
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(3.71)
15.98***
(4.58)

(3.71)
16.30***
(4.59)

(3.64)
15.76***
(4.59)

2.08
(2.52)
‐5.55**
(2.68)
‐1.22
(5.00)

2.11
(2.52)
‐5.60**
(2.68)
‐0.93
(4.99)

2.06
(2.53)
‐5.64**
(2.68)
‐1.16
(5.02)

‐0.01
(0.02)
‐0.27***
(0.03)
‐0.12
(0.34)

‐0.00
(0.02)
‐0.27***
(0.03)
‐0.11
(0.34)

‐0.01
(0.02)
‐0.27***
(0.03)
‐0.13
(0.34)

‐0.05
(0.04)
‐0.08*
(0.04)
0.06*
(0.03)
3.96***
(1.51)

‐0.05
(0.04)
‐0.08*
(0.04)
0.06*
(0.03)
4.01***
(1.51)

‐0.05
(0.04)
‐0.08*
(0.04)
0.06
(0.03)
4.09***
(1.50)

‐0.11**
(0.05)
‐0.04
(0.05)
0.22
(0.18)

‐0.11**
(0.05)
‐0.02
(0.05)
0.20
(0.18)

‐0.11**
(0.05)
‐0.04
(0.05)
0.22
(0.18)

3.16
(9.04)
‐16.34**
(7.62)
3.91
(3.05)
‐4.91
(6.24)

3.27
(9.04)
‐16.39**
(7.62)
4.11
(3.06)
‐4.97
(6.25)

0.49
(8.12)
‐12.20
(7.64)
5.37
(3.72)
‐5.08
(6.25)

‐7.76***

‐7.78***

‐7.82***

Number of non‐English languages patients speak
Interpreter service
Racial Concordance
Black physician/patient interaction
Hispanic physician/patient interaction
Asian physician/patient interaction

(1.61)
‐1.17
(1.11)
4.25*
(2.58)

(1.61)
0.40
(0.71)

(1.62)
‐0.69
(1.27)
4.01
(2.83)

0.36
(0.25)
0.08
(0.24)
‐0.07
(0.29)

0.36
(0.25)
0.07
(0.24)
‐0.08
(0.29)

0.36
(0.26)
0.09
(0.24)
‐0.02
(0.30)

Language Concordance
Black physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients

‐11.16
(9.77)

Black physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐7.33
(11.02)

Black physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐4.34
(10.99)

Hispanic physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients

‐2.13
(6.86)

Hispanic physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

28.91
(28.48)

Hispanic physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐0.33
(8.09)

Asian physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients

0.13
(6.01)

Asian physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐5.87
(5.66)

Asian physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients
Constant

Observations
R‐squared
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91.27***
(5.16)

91.57***
(5.17)

‐7.22
(4.78)
91.06***
(5.17)

4,043
0.157

4,043
0.156

4,043
0.159

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Regression Results for Performance‐Based Annual Income
OLS 1
Dependent Variable: Performance based
income
Experience
Beginning year of practice
after 2005
Beginning year of practice
2001‐2004
Beginning year of practice
1996‐2000
Beginning year of practice
1991‐1995
Beginning year of practice
1986‐1990
Beginning year of practice
1981‐1985
Beginning year of practice
1976‐1980
Gender
Male
Specialty
Internal Medicine
Family Medicine
Pediatric Medicine
Surgical Medicine
Psychiatric Medicine
Obstetric/Gynecologic
Medicine
Certification
Board Certification

OLS 2

OLS 3

Ordered probit

0.018

‐732.19
(10,283.54)

‐478.67
(10,327.33)

669.26
(10,416.52)

21,948.03**
(8,518.57)

22,302.93***
(8,505.67)

21,538.60**
(8,555.83)

35,018.87***
(7,602.39)

35,072.85***
(7,595.50)

34,942.52***
(7,627.38)

41,173.48***
(7,924.47)

41,019.74***
(7,921.00)

42,208.64***
(7,953.64)

34,591.98***
(7,530.41)

34,856.44***
(7,536.34)

35,342.58***
(7,570.47)

29,396.21***
(7,973.48)

29,155.25***
(7,962.97)

29,216.10***
(8,018.31)

26,482.11***
(8,363.69)

26,025.41***
(8,355.43)

26,900.15***
(8,372.23)

(0.125)**

32,653.64***
(4,661.35)

32,877.08***
(4,655.76)

32,392.72***
(4,703.02)

0.505
(0.070)**

‐59,785.91***
(6,083.25)
‐74,281.40***
(6,197.25)
‐69,814.13***
(7,580.13)
15,274.17***
(5,467.25)
‐50,422.61***
(12,564.72)

‐59,833.51***
(6,070.80)
‐74,269.01***
(6,200.85)
‐70,095.73***
(7,583.76)
15,566.10***
(5,468.74)
‐50,465.43***
(12,570.82)

‐60,272.86***
(6,110.35)
‐74,429.51***
(6,227.79)
‐70,474.41***
(7,621.42)
15,339.77***
(5,481.77)
‐49,260.11***
(12,690.45)

‐0.839
(0.091)**
‐1.04
(0.094)**
‐0.989
(0.116)**
0.226
(0.081)**
‐0.686
(0.194)**

6,111.54
(8,863.23)

6,243.64
(8,892.81)

6,199.17
(8,871.66)

‐0.128

14,159.65**
(7,103.45)

14,311.91**
(7,108.83)

13,283.23*
(7,078.05)

0.219
(0.108)*
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‐0.157
0.361
(0.130)**
0.535
(0.116)**
0.649
(0.119)**
0.568
(0.114)**
0.46
(0.122)**
0.432

0.113

Type of Practice
Group Practice
HMO
Medical School
Hospital
Other
Time Worked
Hours
Ownership in Practice
Partial Ownership
Employee
Independent Contractor
Visits per week
Clinical Visits
Hospital Visits
Nursing Home Visits
Types of Reimbursement
Percentage of Medicare
reimbursement
Percentage of Medicaid
reimbursement
Percentage of prospective
payment reimbursement
Bonus eligibility
Race of patients
Percentage of Black patients
Percentage of Hispanic
patients

24,703.94***
(5,803.58)
21,521.16*
(11,093.99)
18,421.16*
(9,740.70)
38,084.77***
(9,288.68)
19,154.38
(13,265.42)

25,042.16***
(5,799.50)
21,579.70**
(10,977.94)
18,370.06*
(9,750.45)
37,772.37***
(9,304.58)
19,326.55
(13,218.50)

24,806.71***
(5,809.26)
22,087.00**
(11,084.68)
19,683.62**
(9,663.15)
36,818.79***
(9,346.62)
20,244.82
(13,549.41)

0.406
(0.084)**
0.438
(0.162)**
0.323
(0.140)*
0.593
(0.134)**
0.338
‐0.201

8.41***
(3.14)

8.53***
(3.14)

8.22***
(3.13)

0
(0.000)**

‐1,763.04
(6,278.71)
‐19,778.38***
(6,527.01)
‐2,948.39
(15,075.5)

‐1,587.76
(6,281.25)
‐19,923.79***
(6,535.52)
‐2,363.93
(15,041.10)

‐2,174.50
(6,308.90)
‐19,852.11***
(6,570.93)
‐4,309.55
(15,129.74)

‐0.009
‐0.092
‐0.26
(0.095)**
‐0.071
‐0.222

523.03***
(58.63)
634.18***
(117.16)
‐413.79
(710.72)

524.70***
(58.60)
628.14***
(117.06)
‐384.38
(711.93)

525.77***
(58.69)
646.94***
(117.64)
‐384.93
(707.76)

0.008
(0.001)**
0.01
(0.002)**
‐0.001
‐0.011

‐22.53
(95.86)

‐23.51
(95.61)

‐23.27
(96.73)

‐220.27*
(130.71)

‐218.07*
(130.89)

‐231.44*
(130.19)

‐37.61
(103.40)
9,672.68**
(3,937.05)

‐35.29
(103.19)
9,888.00**
(3,940.91)

‐50.41
(103.26)
9,540.23**
(3,960.96)

‐0.002
0.153
(0.058)**

‐458.85***
(131.10)

‐459.99***
(131.30)

‐450.72***
(131.03)

‐0.007
(0.002)**

‐15.95
(158.35)

42.31
(155.20)

‐4.72
(159.08)
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0
‐0.001
‐0.003
‐0.002
‐0.001

0
‐0.002

Percentage of Asian patients
Race of Physician
Hispanic physician
Black physician
Asian physician
Other physician
Language parameters
Cultural competency
training
Number of non‐English
languages patients speak
Interpreter service
Racial Concordance
Black physician/patient
interaction
Hispanic physician/patient
interaction
Asian physician/patient
interaction

441.40
(399.62)

389.41
(401.00)

458.97
(402.34)

0.005
‐0.006

3,119.60
(14,561.16)
‐21,604.74
(22,383.23)
4,727.74
(7,061.64)
5,666.73
(17,786.27)

2,999.55
(14,702.53)
‐21,970.28
(22,109.45)
4,475.13
(7,054.36)
4,974.89
(17,919.55)

7,962.55
(15,389.46)
‐15,347.38
(24,073.11)
3,681.38
(8,697.03)
5,538.71
(17,925.98)

0.159
‐0.223
‐0.21
‐0.332
0.074
‐0.131
0.097
‐0.241

‐6,580.38*
(3,965.43)

‐6,600.58*
(3,968.16)

‐6,996.09*
(3,985.85)

‐782.69
(2,948.99)
10,136.09
(6,198.24)

3,050.75*
(1,830.18)

‐105.44
(3,384.92)
8,579.57
(6,921.32)

437.44
(590.81)

435.69
(585.56)

366.16
(574.94)

‐54.95
(490.55)

‐79.27
(495.57)

‐361.67
(467.47)

‐1,162.42
(716.14)

‐1,149.79
(713.98)

‐1,203.85*
(716.80)

Language Concordance
Black physician, 1 non‐English l
anguage spoken by patients

‐22,620.40
(23,649.74)

Black physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐2,374.43
(25,947.59)

Black physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

6,448.10
(20,569.66)

Hispanic physician, 1
non‐English language spoken
by patients

‐0.101
‐0.059
0.006
‐0.05
0.121
‐0.103
0.006
‐0.008
‐0.006
‐0.007
‐0.017
‐0.011
‐0.448
‐0.346
0.031
‐0.344
0.071
‐0.3
0.342

27,022.82
(21,726.50)

Hispanic physician, 2
non‐English languages spoken

8,553.77
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‐0.309
0.221

by patients
(26,864.56)
Hispanic physician, 3
non‐English languages spoken
by patients

‐0.505
‐41,573.30*
(22,729.34)

Asian physician, 1 non‐English
language spoken by patients

5,165.05
(12,622.84)

Asian physician, 2 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

‐12,884.42
(14,419.97)

Asian physician, 3 non‐English
languages spoken by patients

10,638.25
(13,740.43)

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Constant
Observations
R‐squared

‐0.517

100,985.74***
(13,886.29)

101,270.95***
(13,895.33)

102,340.73***
(13,914.47)

1,802
0.375

1,802
0.374

1,802
0.378

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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‐0.327
0.017
‐0.193
‐0.165
‐0.207
0.136
‐0.197
0.133
‐0.214
1.14
(0.213)**
1.883
(0.215)**
2.435
(0.217)**
2.852
(0.219)**

